

Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status: Unique Approach to Neutrality

Bayasgalan Sanalkhudev

Associate professor

The School of Political Science, International Relations and Public
Administration National University of Mongolia, MONGOLIA
bayasgalan@num.edu.mn

Abstract: Throughout the modern history of Mongolia, which dates from 1911s, Mongolia sought to defend its independence and sovereignty. After declaring its independence in 1921, Mongolia did not want to be involved in any conflict and tried to be as neutral as possible. However, due to unfavorable international conditions and rivalry among big powers, Mongolia had fallen under the Soviet protectorate from 1921 to 1990s. Having felt immense pressure from both neighbors, neutrality is not new for Mongolia. Due to its unique geographic location, Mongolia has been within the interests of two neighbors which did not allow it to be neutral. Only since the 1990s, Mongolia conducted its own foreign policy. The neutrality was in focus again. Mongolia made many efforts towards neutrality, which adds broader meaning to neutrality.

In order to be secure Mongolia has been trying many options towards security assurance through domestic laws, bilateral international agreements and UN resolutions.

Mongolia's nuclear neutrality is closely related to its unique location. There is no other country than Mongolia, which is sandwiched between two nuclear weapon powers, the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

This article suggests that Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status can be recognized as one of the options of neutrality in case of nuclear threat or nuclear war.

Keywords: neutrality, Single State Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status, NWFZ, history of Mongolia

Introduction

Since the declaration of independence in 1921, Mongolia wanted to be a neutral country in response to facing external challenges. However, geographical

location, rivalry among two neighbors and other regional powers did not allow Mongolia to be neutral.

Received: 26 November, 2024;

Accepted: 16 December, 2024



ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0300-750X>

© Author (s) 2024, <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

Under the Soviet influence, Mongolia became the Soviet Union's key ally and buffer in Asia. Soviets calculated that in future possible attack or war instigated from Japan or later China, there must be some buffer to safeguard Russia's Far Eastern region. Mongolia fulfilled its role as buffer in 1939 when fight between Soviet Union and Japan took place in Khalkhiin Gol. So that showed that neutrality was not the case for Mongolia.

During 1930-40s, despite Mongolian leaders' resistance to being dragged into the geopolitical competition between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders imposed a mutual defense agreement that resulted in the Soviet military deploying into Mongolia and taking control of Mongolia's politics. (Sandag, Kendall 2000, 173). As a result, however, Mongolia was the only East Asian State to escape Japanese colonial war and gained de facto independence from China, recognized through the Yalta Agreement. (J.Mendee 2022, 4)

During the 1960-80s, Mongolia became caught up in the competition between its conflictual neighbours. This time, Mongolia's leaders welcomed the Soviet military deployments, which strengthened the country's defense capabilities. Mongolia sought extensive developmental aid from the Soviet Union as well as the Socialist Bloc countries. (Jargalsaikhan.M 2019, 53-54) In the early post-World War II years, following the creation of the People's Republic of China, Mongolia found itself surrounded by two communist States, which raised the hope for harmony and all-round cooperation among the three countries.

However, these hopes were dashed with the subsequent Sino-Soviet split by the end of 1950s. The seemingly ideological split by the mid-1960s grew into an overt interstate Sino-Soviet hostility. Forced to choose between China and the Soviet Union, and unable to be 'neutral' in the conflict, Mongolia sided with the Soviet Union for two reasons: first Mongolia was deeply dependent on the Soviet Union in all spheres, particularly, in economy and defense; the second following the 1946 treaty Mongolia already was the ally of the Soviet Union. (Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 343)

Thus, from the 1960s to the end of 1980s Mongolia was victim of two prolonged and costly "cold wars": East-West and Sino-Soviet. In the East-West conflict, Mongolia firmly sided with the Soviets, including on the questions of international security, arms control and disarmament. (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 20-21). In any circumstances, there was no chance to be neutral. During this period Soviet Union (1949) and People's Republic of China (1964) became nuclear powers, respectively.

In January 1966, Mongolia signed a treaty of Friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union; Article 5 of this accord pledged the latter to assist Mongolia in case of external attack. The intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the mid-1960s saw both the Soviet Union and China heavily fortify their common border. Moreover, in 1967 the Soviet Union introduced its troops into Mongolia. Mongolia's two neighbors soon had troops confronting one another directly across the frontier. Having sided firmly with the Soviets in

the Sino-Soviet dispute and with Soviet troops stationed on its territory, Mongolia was more than just a strategic buffer for the Soviets against China: the country was also a springboard from which the Soviets could launch a blitzkrieg-type military offensive into northern China (possibly even at Beijing). Furthermore, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a danger that in an attempt to forestall China's efforts to improve its nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union might be tempted to undertake a preemptive nuclear strike at Chinese nuclear installations. The nature of the Soviet Mongolian alliance and the Brezhnev Doctrine in general meant that the ultimate decision to use force, including any nuclear weapons stationed in Mongolia, would be undertaken by the Soviets alone and the country's role as a strategic bridgehead for any potential Sino-Soviet conflict meant Mongolia itself would surely have been turned into a battlefield. (Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 344)

The subsequent end of the East-West and Sino-Soviet cold wars, the disintegration of the socialist world and of the Soviet Union itself have fundamentally changed Mongolia's

geopolitical environment. These changes have opened the opportunity to abandon its one-sided pro-Soviet policies, and, for the first time in three hundred years, to define and pursue its own national interests and priorities, bearing also in mind the vital interests of its neighbors. (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 23)

However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia, a virtual security vacuum had emerged that could easily be filled by either of the two neighbors or by another great power if they thought this was warranted by their security 'imperatives' or 'needs'. Not being part of any political or military alliances, Mongolia was interested in having a well-defined and internationally agreed status that would include security assurances of the P5¹ tailored to Mongolia's geopolitical location. (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 38)

Like many other small countries bordered or located near powerful countries, Mongolia defines its foreign policy very carefully, and it has pursued neutral foreign and defense policies only since 1992. (Dorj 2016, 32)

Neutrality issue

The idea of neutrality is nearly as ancient as the idea of war, as Karsh observes: "Since the dawn of warfare among humans, there have always been people or factions aiming to steer clear of involvement in a conflict." (Karsh 2012, 13) The concept of neutrality has evolved as a strategy to refrain from participating

in a conflict (Agius & Devine 2011). In this paper I stress conflict or war with nuclear weapons.

Both large and small nations in the international arena face their own challenges, and for smaller nations, a significant issue is maintaining their sovereignty (Novakovic, 2013, Altantuya

¹ P5 – Permanent members of the UN Security Council (the U.S., Russia, China, United Kingdom and France)

Dashnyam 2018)

In the realm of international relations, the main goals of small states have historically been and continue to be "to refrain from engaging in hostilities" or "to prevent conflict with a major power." (Chikovani, 2010, 28;

Bayarkhuu, 2015, 105; Demir, 2008, 8; Altantuya Dashnyam 2018, 106)

As noted by Spring, neutrality can be categorized into two primary types when examining it through the lens of international law: relative neutrality and permanent neutrality (Spring 2014, 34). Primarily, countries opt for these two forms of neutral policies based on their interests and the circumstances they face. Relative neutrality enables nations to remain impartial and uninvolved in specific conflicts; once that conflict concludes, the nation may decide not to maintain its neutrality (Spring 2014, 36). For example, Belgium and Luxembourg chose not to maintain a permanent policy of neutrality following World War II due to their past experiences with powerful nations ignoring their neutrality during two major conflicts in the twentieth century. (Dorj 2016, 14-15)

Permanent neutrality can be viewed as a long-term strategy for a nation. In formal definitions, permanent neutrality means that a state remains neutral during both times of conflict and times of peace. Establishing permanent neutrality necessitates two key conditions: a voluntary pledge to uphold permanent neutrality and acknowledgment from other nations to ensure the country's neutral status is maintained. (Altantuya Dashnyam 2018, 107)

There are primarily two ways to achieve neutrality: a unilateral declaration or through a treaty.

Certain nations have independently proclaimed their neutrality and relied on other countries to acknowledge and ensure it, while other nations have been compelled to adopt a neutral stance. (Andisha 2015, 3)

Consequently, the realist perspective on international relations does not endorse neutrality as a crucial strategy for the survival of a state. (Dorj 2016, 21-22)

According to Christine Agius, the only justifiable reason for maintaining neutrality, from a realist viewpoint, is that smaller, weaker states opt to stay neutral in conflicts when this stance is framed as the sole strategy for ensuring their survival and safeguarding their self-interests. (Jesse 2006, 485) Additionally, Neal G. Jesse states that maintaining a neutral position results from a logical assessment of a small state's interests and abilities, which fosters a state-centered, hostile, and self-reliant international context. (Jesse 2006, 8)

For example, after the Napoleonic Wars, significant European powers such as France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden in the nineteenth century acknowledged Switzerland's enduring neutrality and assured its territorial integrity, which was affirmed by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. (Spring 2014, 54-56) Switzerland maintains the longest-standing policy of military neutrality globally. (Fleiner 2005, 28)

Switzerland's neutrality has been acknowledged through international agreements and upheld by its effective

military. Traditionally, the Swiss approach to neutrality can be seen as a response to the actual and potential control exerted by larger, more powerful countries, particularly its neighboring states. (Novakovic, 2013, 109).

The influential nations implemented comparable measures towards other neutral nations during the nineteenth century: Belgium was recognized as a neutral state through the Treaty of London in 1839, while Luxembourg achieved the same status via the Second Treaty of London in 1867. In the twentieth century, major powers restricted the neutrality of Austria and Laos, thereby ensuring their non-alignment. (Black 1986, 3-4) becoming part of neighboring countries' wars.

Neutrality leads to uncertainty for influential nations because of how neutral states interact with warring parties during conflicts. Strong countries assess the potential danger that a neutral nation might change its stance to favor the victorious side for its own benefit at any moment. (Karsh 2012, 43)

Nevertheless, the three neutrals that emerged successfully (Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden) compromised their neutrality for the benefit of the victorious powers to preserve their independence and sovereignty. When Germany was dominant in the conflict, all three nations compromised their neutrality in favor of the Axis powers; conversely, when the Allies gained the upper hand, they all deviated from their neutral stance to support the Allies. (Dorj 2016, 16)

Sweden and Switzerland permitted German troops to move through their lands,

while Spain set up German military bases within its borders. Moreover, Switzerland granted British planes permission to fly over its airspace and supplied extensive intelligence to the Allies, and Sweden provided weapons and military supplies to Norway to assist in its fight alongside the Soviet Union. (Karsh 2012, 55-59).

Based on geographic factors, a warring state may breach the neutrality of a neighboring country due to its preemptive self-defense and the crucial requirement to protect its sovereignty. (Hull 2014, 26). For example, Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden maintained their status as neutral countries, while other neutral nations such as Belgium and the Netherlands were unable to benefit from their neutrality during the tumultuous wars of the twentieth century. Although, in 1914, Great Britain backed Belgium's neutrality, Germany breached Belgium's neutrality to protect its own security and address its geographic challenges. Germany viewed this infringement as a measure of preemptive self-defense to avoid engaging in battles on two fronts. (Hull 2014, 23-29).

During World War II, Sweden maintained a policy of neutrality; however, the German military breached this neutrality by deploying its forces through Swedish territory. As Spring noted, "The Swedish population believed that accepting certain infringements of neutrality laws was a smaller evil for the overall situation in Scandinavia, as it allowed Sweden to avoid involvement in the conflict" (Spring 2014, 90). Sweden established a policy of neutrality during wartime and upheld a non-alignment

stance while being engaged in international efforts for peace and stability. In 1946, Sweden became a member of the UN and simultaneously joined defense alliances with other Nordic countries, although it chose not to maintain that membership when Denmark and Norway became part of NATO. (Dorj 2016, 52) Related to war in Ukraine, Sweden for security concern decided to join NATO along with Finland. In 2023 Finland and in 2024 Sweden joined the NATO, respectively. The same situation can apply to Mongolia. Soviet Union wanted Mongolia to be a buffer state. Even though Mongolia acquires neutrality it is up to neighbors to decide whether to recognize and respect it or not.

As of Turkmenistan, it voluntarily proclaimed itself permanent neutrality, and in December 1995, this legal status was affirmed through a non-binding resolution by the UN General Assembly. (Spring 2014, 81). The General Assembly had indeed approved a resolution that expressed support for that country's declared permanent neutrality. Turkmenistan was the initial instance in which an international entity acknowledged a unilateral declaration of neutrality. In 1996, Turkmenistan established the formal acknowledgment of its permanent neutrality status as customary law. (Spring 2014, 81). Nonetheless, resolutions from the General Assembly do not provide guarantees on their own. Additionally, Turkmenistan's resolution on neutrality did not include any mechanisms for implementation or verification. It would be a different matter if neutrality had an international legal foundation, at which point Mongolia might

be open to giving it serious consideration. The P3 replied that neutrality could begin with a resolution from the General Assembly. (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 42)

Currently, the principles of neutrality on an international level are established by the Hague Conventions V and XIII. In simpler terms, there is no global treaty or legal document that grants the designation of permanent neutrality. (Spring 2014, 196)

Regardless of whether a small state chooses to proclaim itself neutral, it is the responsibility of major powers to evaluate, acknowledge, or honor that state's neutral status. Specifically, dominant warring states often view buffer and rim states as strategically significant territories, leading them to seek control over these regions before they fall into the hands of a competing power. (Karsh 2012, 82)

In conclusion considering the situation in which Germany breached Belgian neutrality in 1914 to address its geographic concerns as a measure of preemptive self-defense in a two-front conflict, in this instance, any assurances of neutrality transformed into "a scrap of paper," as noted in the report by British Ambassador Sir E. Goschen. (Hull 2014, 23)

Consequently, the methods that neutral countries use to proclaim and secure guarantees for their status vary based on the global political landscape and its evolution. (Dorj 2016, 17)

There remains an uncertainty regarding whether neutrality can ensure the independence and sovereignty of a neutral nation during conflicts between major powers. There isn't a definitive answer to this question. Even smaller countries can

gain the esteem and confidence of stronger nations, and they may secure assurances of their neutrality through pacts or treaties. However, powerful nations, when faced with a threat from another superpower, might dismiss any agreement as merely a "scrap of paper," invoking preemptive self-defense and military necessity. (Hull 2014, 317-318). Consequently, neutrality cannot ensure complete sovereignty. (Dorj 2016, 29)

In the case of Mongolia, realist theory highlights that geographic location poses significant limitations for countries in relation to their survival. This is

particularly relevant for weaker states that, like all nations, have no control over their neighboring countries. According to realist theory, smaller states adopt two kinds of foreign policies to maintain their independence: first, relying on a stronger state for security to counterbalance potential threats and second, pursuing neutral policies to distance themselves from either adversarial or supportive powerful nations. (Bold.R 2000, 32, Beyer 2011, 287) Therefore Mongolia sought legally binding negative security assurance from nuclear powers.

Mongolia's neutrality issue

Depending on geographical location and security environment neutral countries define and understand neutrality differently. From history it can be seen that neutrality is not a guarantee that the country will be totally protected from any intrusion or not to be involved in any confrontation.

There are many neutral status issues, but it depends on geographical location and who the neighbors are. Compared to other countries, European neutral countries, surrounded by democracies with their joint values and interests, are allowed to create EU democracies that don't attack each other. EU countries can just declare neutrality and it's ok, but in the case of Mongolia it is a different story.

The result of both the East-West and Sino-Soviet cold wars, together with the disintegration of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union, has greatly changed Mongolia's geopolitical situation.

(Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 344). Given these new circumstances, Mongolia reduced its total reliance on the Soviet Union, altered its ideologically driven domestic and foreign policies, and adopted a multi-dimensional foreign policy aimed at broadening its international connections beyond mere exchanges with its neighboring nations. (Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 346)

The best scenario for Mongolia occurs when both Russia and China engage in peaceful relations with each other or are distracted by issues outside of their borders and/or are focused on their domestic matters. In these situations, Mongolia's policy of maintaining security and defense neutrality becomes essential for both neighboring powers. If either Russia or China attempts to strengthen security ties with Mongolia, such as providing military supplies or establishing an alliance, it would provoke security concerns for the other country. Consequently, both

neighboring nations consent to respect Mongolia's military neutrality. (J.Mendee 2022)

A highly dangerous scenario emerges when tensions between Russia and China heighten. In this situation, Mongolia would feel the strain from one neighboring country to counteract the other. (J.Mendee 2022, 2-3)

Based on the realist power balance theory, Mongolia faces no external threats, territorial issues, or schemes from its two powerful neighbors. Even in the most challenging circumstances, Mongolia is unable to address any physical threats owing to its limited military forces and constrained capabilities. As a result, Mongolia is not motivated to enter into conflicts with any nation. (Dorj 2016, 38-39) But the battle at Khalkhiin Gol in 1939 showed us that there is a high possibility for Mongolia to be a battlefield for two neighbors.

Since the democratic revolution in Mongolia in 1990, the principle of neutrality has been an integral part of the nation's foreign policy until now. (Purevsuren, 2015, 35; Altantuya Dashnyam 2018, 111)

Since Mongolia cannot declare its neutrality or be recognized by two neighbors as a neutral country, from its part Mongolia initiated to be de facto neutral by putting some key statements in its legal documents. For instance, in Chapter 1 of its Constitution, which declares that "Mongolia will uphold universally accepted norms and principles of international law and pursue a peaceful foreign policy." (the Constitution of Mongolia, 1992) The constitution restricts

the deployment of foreign military troops on its soil and also disallows the passage of foreign military through its land. Mongolia retains armed forces exclusively aimed at ensuring its territorial integrity and self-defense, in accordance with its constitution, with military capabilities dedicated solely to internal security. Furthermore, Mongolia is recognized as a non-aligned country and is internationally recognized as a state free from nuclear weapons. (Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 350; Narangoa 2009, 360)

The significant pragmatic shift in foreign policy is reflected in the Concept of Mongolia's Foreign Policy (CMFP), adopted by the Mongolian parliament, the Ikh Khural, in June 1994. The CMFP articulates that Ulaanbaatar's foreign policy will be founded on political realism, nonalignment, and the pursuit of Mongolia's national interests as outlined in the 1992 Constitution. The CMFP underscores that Mongolia's primary emphasis in foreign relations is to safeguard its security and essential national interests through political and diplomatic avenues. Furthermore, Mongolia has committed to respecting the legitimate interests of its neighboring countries and partners. (Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 346)

According to CMFP, Mongolia adopts an open, multi-faceted, and neutral approach to international relations. This framework underscores that the primary objective of Mongolia's foreign policy is to safeguard its security and crucial national interests through political and diplomatic initiatives, while promoting a conducive external environment for economic, scientific, and technological

progress. (NSCM, 2010) The revised Defense Policy of Mongolia clearly states that Mongolia does not aim to join any military alliances or engage in armed conflicts unless it is responding to a military threat. In addition, Mongolia prohibits the presence of foreign military forces on its territory and does not allow foreign military passage through its land or airspace. (Dorj 2016, 33)

In accordance with the above policy, Mongolia has signed the Treaty of Friendly relations and Cooperation with Russia in 1993 and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with China in 1994, respectively. In these accords, the signatories agreed to develop their relations on a basis that precluded the use or threat of force; demonstrated respect for one another's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; recognized one another's sovereign equality and the inviolability of mutual borders; and pledged noninterference in one another's internal affairs and respect for other principles of international law. In both treaties Mongolia cultivates partnerships that are mutually beneficial and has established strategic cooperation agreements with both the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. (Batbayar.Ts 2003, 958) For instance, in the treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation of 1993, the Russian Federation pledged to respect Mongolia's position of prohibiting the presence and transit of foreign military forces, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction within its territory. (Basics of Mongolia's Defense Policy, 2016) This represented the first concrete indication of support for Mongolia's initiative from

its northern neighbor. (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 24) The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed by China in 1994, reinforced their mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. (Alicia Campi 2005, 7-8). China has expressed its respect for Mongolia's policy that prohibits the deployment or transit of foreign military forces, as well as nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, on or across Mongolian territory. (Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 347)

In 2009, the two nations formalized their relationship through the Declaration of Strategic Partnership, which established a more comprehensive framework for cooperation.

According to mentioned treaties the spirit of neutrality has been put within, therefore, it's called de facto. Mongolia seeks to have its neutrality as much as possible legal binding.

There was even thinking of permanent neutrality. For instance, in September 2015, President of Mongolia Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj along with his foreign policy team, spearheaded a national and international campaign aimed at establishing Mongolia's status as a permanently neutral country. This initiative has prompted considerable debate regarding the appropriateness of such a policy. However, on May 6, 2020, the Mongolian government resolved not to pursue a position of permanent neutrality. This decision was based on the understanding that adopting a permanent neutrality policy could potentially restrict the flexibility of Mongolia's diverse foreign relations strategy. (Jang, Kim 2023, 504)

Also, this stance could have been as a surprise to its neighboring nations and other nuclear powers, particularly given that Mongolia does not face any immediate security threats. (Dorj 2016, 36)

According to scholars and advisors, Mongolia already declares its non-alignment, and if it is guaranteed by an international agreement, its total neutrality might become a permanent feature. Acknowledgment from other countries and a treaty defining Mongolia's neutrality are important prerequisites. (Altantuya Dashnyam 2018, 111)

There seem to be several reasons for the positive response Russia and China have offered thus far. First and foremost, the two countries have shifted their foreign policy stands with respect to one another from confrontation to broad cooperation. The joint declaration signed in Beijing in December 1992 defining the basis of Sino-Russian relations foretold many of the elements that would later be included in the separate treaties each signed with Mongolia. Each declared that it would henceforth resolve disputes between them by peaceful means and would not use force or threaten to do so in any form against each other either directly or through the

territory of neighboring countries. Russia and China also pledged not to participate in any military-political alliances directed against the other nor conclude with third countries any treaties or agreements detrimental to the other's state sovereignty and security interests.

Western governments and leaders will work to avoid needless military confrontations over Mongolia with China or Russia. Similarly, Mongolian leaders do not want to engage in hard balancing or military alliances with far-off heavyweights, especially China and Russia, as this would incite competitiveness and security concerns among those nations. In this case, Mongolia can become a proxy state or a site of geopolitical conflict. (J.Mendee 2022, 7)

Maintaining a trustworthy long-term neutral position proved difficult in cases where there are power disparities and geographic obstacles, such as the lack of direct access to the sea and markets. Furthermore, if neutrality were based on an international convention or accord rather than just a political declaration, it might acquire greater validity. (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 42)

Budapest memorandum and Russian invasion of Ukraine

Considering neutrality issues or security assurance from nuclear powers, particularly, in conflict with nuclear weapons, the recent case is the Budapest memorandum and war in Ukraine, as scholars noted unprovoked invasion of Russia to Ukraine.

After the Cold War, there was a glimpse of a time when nuclear weapons

were out of fashion, and like other buffer countries, Ukraine exchanged security assurance by giving up its nuclear weapon arsenal, being a legal successor of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal on its territory.

When it comes to Ukraine, scholars refer to the Budapest memorandum, in which nuclear weapon powers guaranteed

independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and persuaded to give up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union.

U.S. President Bush officially reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to support all non-nuclear states that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He stated that the United States would pursue timely measures within the United Nations Security Council to provide assistance should Ukraine encounter aggression or threats of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons. (George W. Bush, 1992) The emphasis was placed on encouraging Ukraine to have confidence in the newly established collective security framework within Europe. This can be achieved by actively participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the United Nations, where the principle of border inviolability underpins the "security of all nations." The draft encompasses the following key points: 1. Assurances regarding both positive and negative security from Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); 2. A commitment to uphold Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity while refraining from economic coercion, as outlined in the CSCE Final Act; and 3. An affirmation of the commitment not to employ force or the threat of force against Ukraine's territorial integrity and political independence, in accordance with the principles established by the UN Charter. (George W. Bush, 1992)

Ukrainian negotiators have conveyed that simply reaffirming existing multilateral obligations will not sufficiently guarantee Ukraine's security. (B. Tarasiuk, R. Popadiuk, 1993) The senior leadership of the Rada has formally requested the inclusion of security guarantees in a legally binding treaty (A. Zlenko, 1993). Before the invasion of Russia into Ukraine, the Ukrainian government claimed that Ukraine faced significant challenges, as the perception of the Russian threat has intensified, while Western partners have not provided concessions related to security assurances. Concurrently, Ukraine experienced a degree of international isolation linked to its postponement of denuclearization efforts. (Budjeryn 2014. 162)

In 1994, the signatory states of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), namely Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, extended both positive and negative security assurances to Ukraine. The depository states reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity through the signing of the agreement known as the "Budapest Memorandum" (Memorandum on Security Assurance, 1994). During its tenure as a Soviet republic, Ukraine expressed its intention to position itself as a nonnuclear state in its Declaration of State Sovereignty. (Vyacheslav, 1991) Ukraine has reiterated its commitment to maintain a non-nuclear status moving forward. The country supports a gradual denuclearization process through agreements with other nuclear states (Verkhovna Rada, 1991).

On December 5, 1994, during the CSCE summit in Budapest, the leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and Ukraine endorsed a diplomatic Memorandum reaffirming the previously established security assurances. Furthermore, it included a concise version of the consultation mechanism initially proposed by Ukraine. Article 6 of the Memorandum stated that the parties "will consult if a situation emerges that raises a question regarding these commitments." (Steven Pifer, 2011)

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many have questioned the nuclear weapon issue and security of states even with neutral status.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, the nuclear weapon issue arose again. In relation to this topic, the reason for the Russian invasion of Ukraine was that Russia wanted Ukraine to be neutral, but after 2014 Ukraine did not want to be neutral. It wanted to be a part of EU and with the war it also wanted to join NATO which is unacceptable for Russia. When NATO expanded eastwards to the Ukraine border Russia offered security guarantee

agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2021) to the U.S., however, U.S. denied the offer. Soon after, Russia invaded Ukraine. Following the invasion of Ukraine two questions raised. The first one was why Budapest memorandum did not work? Why did the U.S. and UK (signatures of the memorandum) not respond and protect Ukraine? The second one was why the UN did not respond?² Ukrainians claim that if Ukraine did not give up its nuclear weapons, Russia would have not invaded Ukraine.

The Budapest Memorandum has proven to be ineffective in preventing Russian aggression due to the absence of immediate penalties for its violation. The political guarantees it provided were contingent upon the goodwill and self-discipline of the guarantors, a framework that may be effective among allies but falls short when engaging potential adversaries. The situation in Crimea starkly highlighted how quickly self-discipline can erode when a guarantor adopts a revisionist position. (Budjeryn, 2014)

Mongolia's neutrality in nuclear conflict

The geographical location and historical context surrounding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) indicate that they have typically been formed in regions where nuclear-armed states possess limited geopolitical interests. While some NWFZs may hold geopolitical significance, nuclear powers often refrain from

extending security assurances in these areas. Conversely, the establishment of NWFZs in regions where nuclear-weapon states have substantial geopolitical stakes, as exemplified by the challenges in creating a NWFZ in the Middle East, proves to be considerably more complex. Furthermore, the proposition of a NWFZ in Northeast Asia is not presently on the

² All parties of the Budapest Memorandum which gave security guarantees are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which have veto powers.

political agenda of the region and remains unaddressed, even in informal discussions. (RECNA, 2016)

Mongolia is a country of geopolitical importance for both neighbors. Thus, historically, Mongolia has not been able to be neutral. Since Mongolia cannot be neutral, it has experimented with many ways of de facto recognition, beginning with domestic legal documents, bilateral treaties up to the UN resolution and other international documents. But, seeing nuclear-weapon-free status as a form of neutrality is a little bit of a different story. Being recognized its NWFS as one of the options of neutrality fits for Mongolia, bearing in mind Mongolia's neighbors are strongmen in international relations and permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Mongolia's geographic location became a ground for rivalry between Russia and China. Moreover, it could have been a target of nuclear weapon attack since it was one of the strategic targets of the U.S. during the Cold War.

Mongolia has demonstrated a commitment to nuclear disarmament by being one of the first nations to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and the seventh to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, it is evident that nuclear-armed states are not fulfilling their obligations under Article 6 of the NPT and have not initiated negotiations towards the complete elimination of

nuclear weapons. (Enkhsaikhan.J 2000, 348)

The reason for taking NWFS as one of the options of neutrality is that, first, there is a possibility of nuclear confrontation or war, the second, two nuclear weapon neighbors are the parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty and voluntarily obliged to follow and obey it, and the third, they shall respect Mongolia's NWFS as they declared in 2012. Mongolia's status could be the real protecting factor of becoming a neutral country in possible nuclear war. We shall not ignore nuclear weapon threat or security issues in scope of weapons of mass destruction. We should recall that there were real threats in history that brought us close to nuclear wars: namely, Korean war (1950-1953), Cuban crisis (1962) and Soviet-China border dispute at Damansky island incident (1969). The last case is war in Ukraine, in which both sides refer to nuclear weapons. Ukraine says if it had nuclear weapons Russia would have never invaded it and Russia threatens in the case of threat to national security it will use nuclear weapons.

Even though after the Cold War elimination of nuclear weapons was very popular with the circumstance it has changed dramatically after the war in Ukraine. Now, nuclear weapons have become popular again and the total military budget of the world has increased sharply.

Declaration of Mongolia's NWFZ

Following the end of the Soviet military withdrawal, President of

Mongolia, Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat addressed the 47th Session of the United

Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1992, during which he announced that his nation had formally declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. He highlighted Mongolia's dedication to pursuing international recognition of this status. (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 349)

Since Mongolia was an exceptional case, the reaction of nuclear-weapons states, including Mongolia's two neighbors, to the initiative was positive.

The international community, including the five recognized nuclear-weapon states (P5), two of which border Mongolia, have expressed its support for this initiative (Enkhsaikhan, 2000, 342).

The absence of territorial, border disputes or political disputes between Mongolia and its neighbors, along with Mongolia's clearly defined foreign policy objectives and security concepts, has played a significant role in fostering positive responses from both Russia and China. (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 351)

Russia and China have expressed support for Mongolia's declaration and committed to honoring its efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The Russian Federation, in Article 4 of the 1993 treaty with Mongolia, committed to respecting Mongolia's position on nuclear weapons, including actions by external parties regarding the deployment of such weapons on Mongolian territory (N.Tuya, 2012, 12). Like Russia, China reaffirmed its intention to uphold Mongolia's status and its positions regarding sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nuclear weapon issues upon signing its bilateral friendship treaty with Mongolia in 1994. (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 349). In

general, China has pledged not to utilize or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones or non-nuclear weapon states such as Mongolia.

In contrast to Russia, China's approach has been characterized by a focus on assurance. It has refrained from mentioning Mongolia's status as a factor in non-proliferation and asserted that its commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states extends to Mongolia as well.

However, both Russia and China were not prepared to entertain the idea of signing a separate treaty with Mongolia concerning specific nuclear-related matters. (N.Tuya, 2012, 11-12)

In 1993, the US Ambassador noted that the United States adopts a selective approach when formally associating with regional non-proliferation zones. For instance, while the United States has signed and ratified the protocols to the Tlatelolco Treaty, it has not signed those related to the Rarotonga Treaty. Consequently, any consideration of formal endorsement by the United States of Mongolia's policy on a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) would necessitate, at a minimum, a clear and detailed understanding of how the Government of Mongolia intends to implement this policy. Nonetheless, the United States would not object to Mongolia referencing existing US security assurances under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The essence of the draft articulates that, "In the event of a threat from a nuclear weapon State to employ force against a non-nuclear weapon State, the United

States will pursue immediate action from the Security Council to facilitate support, in accordance with the Charter, for any non-nuclear weapon State Party to the NPT that is a target of an act of aggression or faces a potential threat of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons."

The United Kingdom has also issued a statement affirming that the positive and negative security assurances provided to all non-nuclear States Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also extends to Mongolia. This endorsement from the UK serves as a positive indication of the support from the P5 regarding Mongolia's initiatives and policies. In the event that Mongolia encounters a threat and seeks to address the matter through the United Nations Security Council, the United States, in conjunction with other Council members, would evaluate and determine the appropriate measures to undertake. (J.Enkhsaikhan, 2013, 25-27)

Mongolia's actions exemplify how smaller states can undertake significant measures to enhance their security while simultaneously building greater confidence and promoting regional peace and stability. Furthermore, the Mongolian government has acknowledged that credible declarations of foreign support alone will not be sufficient for the successful implementation of its single-state initiative. Consequently, President Ochirbat has underscored the necessity for an "internationally guaranteed status," aimed at ensuring that Mongolia's initiative is recognized as legally binding under international law. (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 352)

In 1996, following the declaration of 1992 at the United Nations, Mongolia, in partnership with Kyrgyzstan, drafted and disseminated Resolution (A/C.1/51/L.29, 1996). This resolution aimed to encourage the General Assembly to recognize the commitment of the Central Asian States to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). It commended those Central Asian States that had designated their territories as a NWFZ, implicitly referencing Mongolia, and urged the Permanent members of the Security Council and other States to endorse the concept of a single-state NWFZ. Furthermore, it called upon these nations to provide the necessary cooperation and to refrain from any actions that would undermine the spirit of this initiative. (J.Enkhsaikhan, 2013, 32) When Mongolia expressed its interest in joining Central Asia and proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, both Russia and China voiced opposition to Mongolia's participation, citing its absence of a common border with any of the member states (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2001, 226; N.Tuya, 2012, 6). An expanded membership in a Central Asian zone was not a popular idea among the nuclear-weapon states.

Mongolia's proposal to start deliberations at the UN on the concept of single-state nuclear weapon-free zones was prompted by awareness that the country would not be able to join a regional arrangement to promote its nuclear-weapon-free status.

Mongolia's Single State NWFS and Nuclear weapon States

US Ambassador J. King, representing the United Kingdom and France, advised caution regarding the use of the term "zone." The P3³ sought clarification on Mongolia's true objectives: whether it aspired to achieve full status as a NWFZ with all the accompanying legal assurances and requirements. U.S. Ambassador J. King emphasized that advocating for the establishment of a single state NWFZ is not a viable option. In 1997, the P3 nations issued a warning to Mongolia regarding any efforts to advance beyond its political declaration of 1992. Such actions would be interpreted as a deviation from the established principles surrounding NWFZs.

The Belgian delegate, representing the EU⁴, proposed to the Mongolian delegation the consideration of a "status" that remains somewhat undefined. (J.Enkhsaikhan, 2013, 35-37)

In the context of deliberating on the concept of a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone as a prospective normative framework, Ambassador Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan, the Mongolian negotiator, later noted that the primary concern of participating states was the potential risk that such acceptance could create a precedent that complicates their strategic calculations and policies. For this reason, these states have expressed a willingness to collaborate with Mongolia to identify an acceptable solution, as they seek to avoid establishing a standard that might be adopted by other states in less favorable

circumstances. (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 358) According to the Mongolian negotiator, nuclear weapon states also indicated that the establishment of such a norm could potentially deter groups of countries from creating regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. (N.Tuya, 2012, 8)

The resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1998, titled "Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status," aimed to address the concerns of nuclear-weapon states. It invited member states, particularly the five recognized nuclear-weapon states, to support Mongolia in consolidating and strengthening its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of its frontiers, economic security, nuclear-weapon-free status, and independent foreign policy (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 354).

Even though Mongolia managed to adopt the UN resolution on Mongolia's security in 1998, P5 countries were slow to express their attitudes towards respecting Mongolia's status.

Although, domestically, the nuclear weapon-free status is enshrined in the National Security Concept and Foreign Policy Concept, Mongolia decided to initiate its available move and the Parliament enacted the Law of Mongolia on its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status in 2000 (Law of NWFS, 2000). It has prohibited the utilization of Mongolia's territory for actions against other nations (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 348). In addition

³ P3 are three Permanent members of the UN Security Council (the U.S., United Kingdom and France)

⁴ EU chaired the UN General Assembly at that time.

to prohibiting the deployment or transit of foreign troops across its territory, the country enforces a strict ban on the entry or passage of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It has requested assurances of compliance from P5 States (J.Mendee 2022, 7).

After resuming contact and talks with the five nuclear-weapon States in 2011 and 2012 regarding its nuclear-weapon-free status, on 17 September 2012 Mongolia and the five States signed parallel declarations at United Nations Headquarters concerning security assurances. In its declaration, Mongolia, based on its legislation of 2000, not only reaffirmed the general prohibitions implemented pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but also pledged not to station or transport nuclear weapons or parts or components of such weapons nor nuclear waste by any means through its territory and welcomed the pledges made by the five nuclear-weapon States in 2000 and on 17 September 2012.

In 2011, China reiterated its support for Mongolia's initiatives aimed at promoting its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as safeguarding its national security and vital interests through political and diplomatic

avenues. In 2012, China reaffirmed its position, stating that it "respects and welcomes Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status" (Statement by China, 2012).

The United States has expressed support for the Mongolian initiative; however, it has aligned with Russia in opposing its legal institutionalization. However, P5 welcomed Mongolia's declaration of its status, referred to as "the formulation," rather than the status itself. This formulation has led to the perception that the nuclear-weapon states have not fully recognized Mongolia's status, but have merely acknowledged its declaration (N.Tuya 2012, 15-19).

In principle P5 countries acknowledge and affirm Mongolia's status as a nuclear-weapon-free state, commend its constructive and balanced relationships with its neighboring countries, and invite both its neighbors and other nuclear-armed states to collaborate with Mongolia in formalizing this status. Furthermore, P5 countries urge to uphold and support Mongolia's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of its borders, preservation of its ecological balance, and commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 39).

Institutionalization - a form of neutrality

In the case of Mongolia, the term "institutionalization" was first introduced in 1997 during an address to the United Nations by the foreign minister, and it has since become a key term in describing Mongolia's efforts to legally formalize its nuclear-weapon-free status. However,

institutionalizing NWFS is an appropriate move, which by itself it is not neutrality, but it is de facto neutrality or allows Mongolia to be not affected by two neighbors' ventures.

Other countries under the term neutrality mostly understand security

issues, but it does not necessarily include the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ).

Mongolia's case is unique not only for being a single state but also nuclear weapon free territory which can be interpreted as neutral. The reason why NWFS is associated with neutrality is because Mongolia needs a guarantee of not to be involved in any conflict with nuclear weapons.

Mongolia's initiative appears to be primarily politically motivated, serving as a form of insurance rather than an act of preventive diplomacy, especially considering that the nation is not currently threatened militarily by either of its neighboring countries.

The proposed creation of a NWFZ is aimed at establishing a legal barrier to prevent any future attempts to reintroduce or deploy nuclear weapons within Mongolia, regardless of circumstances. This initiative seeks to ensure that the country does not have to face the potential threats it encountered during the 1960s and 1970s. (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 351)

In Mongolia's case, nuclear weapon States faced significant challenges in accepting two key concepts: (a) the idea of a single-state Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), although they did acknowledge the possibility of considering Mongolia as an exception, and (b) the establishment of such a zone in an institutionalized manner. Mongolia, which does not belong to any regional or bilateral alliances, contended that its NWFZ would only be credible if its broader security concerns were adequately addressed. This position indicates that Mongolia's situation is not typical, as

all previously established NWFZs were formed within the context of existing regional arrangements or mechanisms.

Consequently, a novel approach is necessary, and the institutionalization of the zone should accurately reflect this unique context. Another distinctive feature of Mongolia's situation is that the new zone will be adjacent to two nuclear-armed states, with no neighboring non-nuclear states. (Enkhsaikhan.J, 2000, 353)

This pursuit has been characterized by two primary actions: first, an initiative to open discussions at the United Nations regarding the concept of a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone; and second, an endeavor to negotiate a trilateral agreement with Russia and China, which would include a protocol on security assurances for Mongolia to be potentially signed by all five recognized nuclear-weapon states. (N.Tuya, 2012, 6)

Mongolia is contemplating two potential options: the first, the establishment of a legal instrument regarding Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status with its two immediate neighbors (China and the Russian Federation) accompanied by a separate protocol to be signed by all five nuclear-weapon States; and the second, the international recognition and institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status through the development of an international custom pertaining to this status. The concept of institutionalization is characterized by the pursuit of a treaty-based commitment from the nuclear-weapon states to acknowledge and respect Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status (N.Tuya, 2012, 11).

Mongolia's focus on security has been primarily rooted in political considerations rather than military ones. It is recognized that Mongolia seeks not only resolutions and nuclear security assurances but also broader political and legal guarantees from the great powers.

In 2012, through diligent diplomatic efforts, Mongolia achieved a significant milestone when P5, issued a joint statement affirming their commitment to respect Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. They expressed their intent not to engage in any actions that would contravene this status. (J.Enkhsaikhan 2013, 46).

Mongolia has been working to institutionalize the nuclear-weapon-free status by concluding a legally binding trilateral instrument with Russia and China. The representative of Mongolia emphasized the significance of formalizing the status by establishing an international treaty. (J.Enkhsaikhan, 2013, 42) Mongolia took an additional step in institutionalizing its nuclear-weapon-free status by submitting a draft trilateral agreement to Russia and China. This initiative aimed to establish a legal framework that provides security assurances to Mongolia, reflecting a treaty-based approach. (N.Tuya, 2012, 9) to which both neighbors are reluctant to respond. When Mongolia requested

a security guarantee, two neighbors' reactions were "who is threatening Mongolia?"

Russia exhibited a notable reluctance to engage in a new treaty with Mongolia pertaining to nuclear-related matter. A Russian representative referred to the bilateral Treaty of 1993 and specifically highlighted that other nuclear-armed states also had to express their positions on this issue. Russian desire is to have all nuclear-weapon states involved in the discussions (N.Tuya, 2012, 12). China expressed support for the draft, it shared similar concerns as Russia regarding the emphasis placed on Mongolia's two neighboring countries. China proposed extending an invitation for all Permanent Members of the Security Council to collaborate with Mongolia. (J.Enkhsaikhan, 2013, 47)

The United States has expressed its opposition to the concept and the terminology of "institutionalization." The other two shared the U.S. position. In response, Mongolia clarified that institutionalization does not exclusively pertain to the creation of new institutions, but rather focuses on establishing a legal framework for Mongolia's status as a nuclear-weapon-free nation.

Conclusion

Since the time of independence Mongolia tried to avoid any confrontation with big powers which can cause many problems. Throughout the modern history of Mongolia, Mongolia experienced many pressures from both neighbors and was a victim of powers' rivalry as well.

Considering the history in which neutrality has relative significance in assuring security, Mongolia among other similar countries has tried to maintain its neutrality in the most possible ways.

Because Mongolia cannot declare its neutrality, due to big powers' interests, and

also its own interest, it adopted domestic law and signed international treaties, in which the context of neutrality is included. Thus, it can be said that Mongolia is de facto neutral.

Bearing in mind Mongolia's unique location, which is between two nuclear powers, and high risk of becoming a battleground in nuclear war, Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status could be recognized as a neutral status in case of nuclear war.

As previously mentioned, Mongolia has sought many ways to be neutral, but the main point is a legally binding document or security assurance from nuclear weapon powers, which is still not happening.

For now, P5 recognizes Mongolia's status only, which is not bad but it is not enough because none of them gave negative security assurance to Mongolia. There is no legally binding treaty that can oblige nuclear weapon powers not to violate neutrality of a nuclear weapon free country.

Even though neutral countries with legally binding treaties have not full guarantee of neutrality, as we can see from the war in Ukraine, the strongest possible way is still legal binding treaties, preferably, with countries which are directly linked to the country's security both in bilateral relations, regionally and globally.

References

- Altantuya Dashnyam, (2018), "Small State' Security and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Mongolian Permanent Neutral Status." *The European Proceeding of Social and Behavioural Sciences*.
- J. Enkhsaikhan, (2001), "Mongolia's Status: The Case for a Unique Approach," *Asian Affairs: An American Review*,
- Enkhsaikhan.J, (2000), "Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status: Concept and Practice," *Asian Survey* 40, no. 2
- J.Enkhsaikhan, (2013), "Converting a Political Goal to Reality: The First Steps to Materialize Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status." *Mongolian Journal of International Affairs*.
- Enkhsaikhan.J, (2016) Lessons learned from experiences in establishing NWFS of Mongolia, RECNA policy paper,
- Li Narangoa, (2009), "Mongolia and Preventive Diplomacy: Haunted by History and Becoming Cosmopolitan," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 2
- S. Sandag, and H.H. Kendall, (2000), *Poisoned Arrows: The Stalin-Choibalsan Mongolian Massacres, 1921–1941* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
- M. Jargalsaikhan, (2019), Small Islands of Democracy in an Authoritarian Sea: Explaining Mongolian and Kyrgyz Democratic Development, (doctoral dissertation), Vancouver,
- J.Mendee, N.Soyolgerel. (2022). *Mongolia's New Foreign Policy Strategy: A Balancing Act with Central and Northeastern Asia*. Ulaanbaatar.
- N.Tuya, (2012), *Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status: Recognition vs Institutionalization*. Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution.
- M.Dorj, (2016), Potential effects of permanent neutrality on Mongolia's defense foreign cooperation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.
- Tsedendamba Batbayar, (2003) "Mongolian-Russian relations in the past decade," *Asian Survey* 43, no. 6
- Alicia Campi, (2005) "Sino-Mongolian Relations from Beijing's Viewpoint," *China Brief* 5, no. 10
- Efraim Karsh, (2012) *Neutrality and Small States*, Routledge
- Laurent Goetschel, (2011) "Neutrals as Brokers of Peacebuilding Ideas?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no.3, doi: 10.1177/0010836711416957.
- Alexander Spring (2014), *The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century: An Analysis of Contemporary Neutrality with a Focus on Switzerland*.
- Nasir A. Andisha, (2015) "Neutrality in Afghanistan Foreign Policy," Special Report 360. United States Institute of Peace.
- Neal G.Jesse, (2006) "Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective," *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique* 27, no. 1. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445034>;

- Morgenthau (1939) "The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe," 485.
- Thomas Fleiner; Alexander Misis; Nicole Töpperwien (2005). *Swiss Constitutional Law*. Kluwer Law International. ISBN 978-9041124043.
- Isabel V. Hull, (2014) *A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law During the Great War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ravdan Bold, (2000) *The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia*, (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolia, The Institute for Strategic Studies,
- Jessica L. Beyer and Stephanie C. Hofmann, (2011) "Varieties of Neutrality Norm Revision and Decline," *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no. 3.
- Jang, J., & Kim, K., (2023), Mongolia becoming a permanent neutral nation? Focusing on the debate and challenges of the permanent neutral nation policy. *The Pacific Review*, 37(3), 504–532. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2184853>
- Steven Pifer, (2011), *The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons*, Annex II.
- E.Jargalsaikhan, (2021), "Mongolian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status – An Example of Soft Power Policy," in *The Key Issues of Soft Power in Global Affairs and Mongolia*, Ulaanbaatar
- The Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia (1992), *The Constitution of Mongolia*, Ulaanbaatar; Mongolia, www.parliament.mn/en/law/categories/2541/pages/4428.
- The Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia (2010), *National Security Concept of Mongolia*.
- The Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia, *The Constitution of Mongolia*, Ulaanbaatar; Mongolia, 1992, www.parliament.mn/en/law/categories/2541/pages/4428.
- The Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia, *Basics of Mongolia's Defense Policy*, last modified July 15, 2016, <http://www.mod.gov.mn/index.php?com=content&id=133>.
- "Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," December 5, 1994, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998>
- Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, On the Nonnuclear Status of Ukraine, October 24, 1991, <http://zakon.nau.ua/doc/?code=1697-12>.
- Verkhovna Rada of Ukrainian SSR, Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, July 16, 1990, <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=55-12>
- "Vyacheslav Chornovil on Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine," *Molod Ukrajinny*, September 12, 1991.
- Black, et al., (1986) *Neutralization and World Politics*,
- "Letter of US President George H.W. Bush to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk," June 23, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 12, Central State Archive of Ukraine. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119814>

- "Draft Joint US-Russia Statement on security assurances for Ukraine," December 10, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 12, Central State Archive of Ukraine. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119816>
- "Letter of Foreign Minister of Ukraine A. Zlenko to President L. Kravchuk," June 3, 1993, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 280, Central State Archive of Ukraine. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119818>
- Letter of President L. Kravchuk to Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada I. Plyushch, January 24, 1994, 1/16/4964, Ukrainian National State Archive. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121102>
- "Security Council Fails to Adopt Text Urging Member States Not to Recognize Planned 16 March Referendum in Ukraine's Crimea Region," March 15, 2014, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2014/sc11319.doc.htm>.
- Mongolia, NTI, 25 September 2020, www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-weapon-free-status-mongolia/.
- United Nations, "Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status," 20 May 2022, www.un.org/nwzf/content/mongolias-nuclear-weapon-free-status;
- Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status, 2000, https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/uploads/res/document/law-of-mongolia-on-its-nuclear-weapon-free-status_html/Law_of_Mongolia_on_its_nuclear-weapon-free_status.pdf
- "Security Council Fails to Adopt Text Urging Member States Not to Recognize Planned 16 March Referendum in Ukraine's Crimea Region," March 15, 2014, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2014/sc11319.doc.htm>.
- UNGA document A/C.1/51/L.29 of 29 October 1996
- UNGA, document no. A/CN.10/195.
- 2010 NPT Review Conference, *Working Paper on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Submitted by China* (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.5), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.5
- Statement by China at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2012 NPT Review Conference. Vienna. April 30, 2012, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2015/PrepCom2012/statements/20120430/China.pdf>.
- Press release on Russian draft documents on legal security guarantees from the United States and NATO (2021), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1790809/
- Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, <https://www.un.org/nwzf/content/mongolias-nuclear-weapon-free-status#:~:text=>